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CFTC reassesses the role of speculators. Before Gary Gensler became its 
chairman, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) held the view 
that speculators had little influence on the price of crude oil, but since then a 
reassessment has been taking place. The crude oil market is particularly suitable 
for an analysis of the role of speculative trading due to the enormous importance 
of oil to the global economy as a commodity and the high liquidity of its futures 
market. 
The influence of speculation can be substantiated. This article measures 
speculator activity on the basis of variables contained in the weekly CFTC market 
reports and analyses speculator influence on crude oil prices and crude oil price 
volatility using econometric procedures. The results suggest an influence of 
speculators’ dispersion in beliefs on both crude oil prices and price volatility. 
Limiting the data basis until 2006 leads to results roughly consistent with those 
based on the current data set. The structural impact of speculators on the crude oil 
market thus does not seem to vary significantly. 
Results suggest where regulatory reform should be targeted. It is not 
the activities of speculators themselves, but speculators’ dispersion in beliefs that 
drives crude oil prices – as this paper shows. For this reason the findings of the 
CFTC also suggest how regulation could be targeted. 
Do speculators drive  
crude oil prices? 
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Dispersion in beliefs among speculators  








This article discusses the influence of speculators in the futures 
market on crude oil prices. The results suggest the dispersion in 
beliefs influences both crude oil prices and price volatility.  
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1 The CFTC and the role of speculators 
With Gary Gensler taking office as chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) in May 2009, its assessment of the role of speculators changed. In July 2008, i.e. when 
the commodity boom was at its peak, the CFTC still held the view that there was not sufficient 
evidence
1 of the influence of speculators on commodity prices and even attributed to them th e 
market-serving functions from the Keynes -Kaldor textbook.
2 These conclusions were already 
controversial at that time as not only had the price of crude oil multiplied in the space of a few 
years but the volume of index funds investing in commodities  had also risen almost 20-fold.
3 
The reappraisal of the CFTC prompted us to analyse the influence of speculators on the crude 
oil market in this paper. Furthermore, instructions for action by the CFTC can be derived from 
the results we present. The crude oil ma rket is particularly suitable for analysing the role of 
speculators. First, crude oil is particularly important for the development of economies. Second, 
the NYMEX crude oil futures market is the largest and most liquid futures market worldwide, 
which makes it particularly attractive for speculators. Third, crude oil prices are highly volatile, 
and the price of crude rose more than tenfold between 1998 and 2008. The CFTC now shares 
OPEC’s  view,  which  has  already  highlighted  the  influence  of  speculators  for  years.  For 
example,  Adnan  Shihab-Eldin,  director  of  OPEC’s  Research  Division,  stated  back  in  2005: 
“Today,  and  especially  with  non-fundamental  factors  –  such  as  speculation  in  oil  futures 
markets – playing such a critical role in oil price determination, we feel that leaving such a 
sensitive trading environment as the oil market to its own devices would surely be a recipe for 
disaster,  both  for  producers  and  consumers.  Hence  our  continued  commitment  to  ensuring 
market stability.”
4 Many other similarly pointed quotes from OPEC officials exist or can be found 
in  OPEC  reports.  The  fact  that  no  attention  was  paid  to  OPEC’s  views  hardly  comes  as  a 
surprise.  However,  the  disregard  for  a  BIS  study  (2004)  and  the  evidence  of  a  correlation 
between speculation and the price of crude oil is all the more surprising. In addition, some 
articles published by academics have discussed speculators’ influence on crude oil prices and 
were apparently deemed to be irrelevant by the CFTC (Pindyck 2001, Hamilton 2008). 
Following these introductory remarks, theories on speculators’ influence on financial markets 
are described in Section 2. Section 3 characterises the crude oil market. Section 4 provides 
descriptions of the variables used for the econometric estimates and regression results. Section 
5  contains  the  regression  results  on  price  volatility.  Section  6  reports  the  summary  and 
evaluation of the results. 
 
2 Theories on speculators’ influence on financial markets 
Keynes (1930) and Kaldor (1939) regarded speculators as market-stabilising forces allowing 
other traders to engage in hedging activity. According to the Keynes-Kaldor theorem, the market 
positions of speculators only incur average losses, however, so that they do not affect the long-
term market development. Traders who actually intend to use the commodity traded therefore 
profit from speculators due to higher market liquidity and additional profit potential. 
                                                       
1 Although consistently almost positive correlations are found between net non-commercial positions and 
the oil price between early 2003 and 2008, in the subsequent Granger causality analysis, the period is 
extended to 2000, and the results suggest that prices drive non-commercial positions and not vice-versa. 
2 “As such, speculators serve important market functions – immediacy of execution, liquidity, 
and information aggregation.” CFTC (2008b). 
3 See Masters (2008). 
4 http://www.opec.org/opecna/Speeches/2005/CosmoVie.htm (24 Nov 2009). 3 
Some recent financial-market models show how speculators may have market influence also in 
the long term. While traders who want to buy the physical commodity trade close to fair value, 
speculators find it difficult to distinguish between the market price and the fair value. Thus, they 
continue their trading activity even if a large gap has opened up between market prices and 
fundamentally justified prices. Speculators’ dispersion in beliefs thus increases price volatility. 
Second-round  effects  from  increased  price  volatility  may  put  additional  upward  pressure  on 
volatility. First, the market as a result of the already higher price volatility and the findings of 
regular  persistence  of  volatility  persistence  measures  has  become  even  more  attractive  for 
speculators. Second, with every  additional speculator in the market, the market influence of 
traders, interested in using the physical commodity, declines. A small number of these traders 
may  then  become  the  plaything  of  speculators  as  traders,  due  to  an  increasing  number  of 
speculators, try to avoid the increasing risk of losses incurred by positions against the market. In 
the short run all speculators may profit from rising prices. Yet, in the long run prices might burst 
and this market environment either comes to an end or is renewed by new speculators being 
out for easy money. If a market is large and liquid and traded products are scarce and important 
for the production process, speculators may be repeatedly attracted such that market prices 
may differ from fair prices considerably and regularly. (Harrison and Kreps 1978, DeLong et al. 
1990, Harris and Raviv 1993, Shalen 1993, Odean 1998, Daniel et al. 2001, Banerjee 2008, 
Cao and Ou-Yang 2009). 
The following null hypotheses can be deduced from these models: 
Hypothesis 1: The dispersion in beliefs of speculators has no influence on crude oil prices. 
Hypothesis 2: The dispersion in beliefs of speculators has no influence on the volatility of crude 
oil prices. 
 
3 Characterisation of the crude oil market 
A large variety of fundamental market forces – OPEC, oil discoveries, limited production and 
refinery capacities, new technologies, the increase in demand for oil in the emerging markets, 
the building-up and drawing down of oil inventories, catastrophic weather and not least political 
unrest and wars – have an impact on the development of oil prices. Developing a simple model 
that is simple but which also factors in all relevant market forces is therefore a mammoth task. 
This holds all the more since both demand and supply are relatively price inelastic in the short 
term. The more price inelastic a supply curve, the more market prices are affected by a shift in 
the demand curve. Thus, even without the impact of speculators, small fundamental changes in 
market factors may cause relatively large changes in prices. 
Such major market uncertainties about fair value provide the ideal environment for successful 
investing by speculators. If speculators, such as hedge funds, also only invest outside capital 
they can profit from market fluctuations and risky investment strategies without bearing the risk 
of personal wealth losses.
5 For this purpose, specula tors typically use the futures market to 
avoid the physical ownership of commodities by squaring market positions. Due to their high 
liquidity, the favourite vehicles for investment are NYMEX crude oil contracts whose underlying 
is 1,000 barrels of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) reference crude. 
                                                       
5 A case in point is the fund of Amaranth Advisors LLC which initially generated high returns by making 
risky bets. In 2006, the fund had USD 9 bn under management before even riskier bets incurred losses of 
USD 6 bn. See Economist “A big hedge fund in trouble”, Sep 21, 2006. 4 
CFTC itemises the long and short positions of all market participants in weekly reports. Long 
and  short  contracts  also  reflect  expectations  on  future  oil  prices.  Traders  who  expect  rising 
prices go long while traders expecting falling prices build up short positions. Furthermore, a 
distinction is made between commercial and non-commercial futures traders. Non-commercials, 
despite some difficulties in drawing a distinction
6 are above all hedge funds and other market 
participants who might be regarded as speculators. CFTC considers,  for example, speculators 
who execute their trading via swap transactions to be commercial traders, so that our variables 
introduced below probably underestimate speculators’ influence. In line with the description of 
the  futures  market,  the  hypotheses  formulated  above  may  be  operationalised  as  follows, 
whereby a rejection of the null hypotheses suggests that speculators do influence the price of 
crude oil. 
Hypothesis 1: In the futures market, the number of long positions taken by non-commercials 
does not have a positive influence on the price of WTI crude in the spot market and the number 
of short positions taken by non-commercials does not have a negative influence on the price of 
WTI crude in the spot market. 
Hypothesis 2: In the futures market, the number of long positions taken by non-commercials 
does not have a positive influence on the volatility of WTI in the spot market and the number of 
short positions taken by non-commercials does not have a negative influence on the volatility of 
WTI in the spot market. 
 
4 Impact of speculators on price development 
Due to major uncertainty about the macroeconomic determinants of the crude oil market, we 
shall not construct  a model that replicates the data generating process but  will analyse  the 
impact of speculators on the development of prices using simple specifications. The testing of 
the  hypotheses  is  based  on  both  weekly  and  monthly  data  (w  specifications  and  m 
specifications in estimation tables). Figure 1 shows the weekly price development of WTI and 
the turnover of both long and short non-commercial positions in the futures market.  
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Figure 1: Noncommercial Positionen (Weekly)
in 1000, USD5 
All three time series are initially relatively uniform and rise sharply at the beginning of the new 
century, indicating a new economic environment. The regressions therefore consider only data 
from after the turn of the millennium. Furthermore, all statistics are calculated for the entire 
survey  period  until  2009  and  for  the  period  prior  to  the  financial  crisis  (p  specifications  in 
estimation tables) until July 2006. In addition, non-commercial long positions are designated as 
FutLong variables and non-commercial short positions similarly as FutShort. 
 
Dispersion of beliefs in the nonstationary world 
Standard unit root tests do not reject the nonstationary hypotheses for all three variables. Tests 
on the number of cointegration ranks are documented in Table 1 and also confirm the existence 
of at least one cointegration rank. 
 
 
Table 1 (W=weekly data): number of cointegration ranks 
LR Johansen Trace Test, variables: WTI, FutLong, FutShort 






1  11.12  15.66
*  9.70  9.11 
2  1.36
  11.32
  0.02  0.58 
N  491  482  341  338 
#Lags  2  11  1  4 
Period  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jul 06 
Constants and a trend are included in all specifications, whereas the cointegration relationship 
does not include a trend but a constant. AIC and BIC determine the optimum lag length. * at the 





Table 1 (M=monthly data): Number of cointegration ranks 
LR Johansen Trace Test variables: WTI, FutLong, FutShort 










  1.11  1.87
 
N  111  107  73  69 
#Lags  2  6  4  8 
Period  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jul 06 
Constants  and  a  trend  are  considered  in  all  specifications,  whereas  the  cointegration 
relationship does not include a trend but a constant. AIC and BIC determine the optimum lag 
length. * at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5% significance level. 
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The cointegration relationship is determined using the Johansen error correction model. The 
results of the rank test are used to impute a rank for calculating the cointegration equation. For 
the calculation the coefficient of WTI is standardised to 1. 
t t t t ec FutShort FutLong WTI 2 1      , 
where  the  coefficient  of  WTI t  is  standardised  to  1,  1    and  2    are  the  coefficients  of  th e 
cointegration equation and ect is the error correction term.  
 
Table 2 (W): Standardised variable in cointegration relationship: WTI 






  (0.024)  (0.085)  (0.032)  (0.018) 
FutShort  -0.196
**  -0.122  -0.187
**  -0.122
** 
  (0.030)  (0.109)  (0.042)  (0.023) 
Adj. Coeff.   0.00023  -0.04262
**  0.00107  0.00293 
  (0.0002)  (0.00808)  (0.00138)  (0.00259) 
N  491  482  341  338 
#Lags  2  11  1  4 
Period  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jul 06 
Constants  and  a  trend  are  considered  in  all  specifications,  whereas  the  cointegration 
relationship does not include a trend but a constant. AIC and BIC determine the optimum 
lag length. * at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
Table 2 (M): Standardised variable in cointegration relationship: WTI 










**  -0.232 
  (0.095)  (0.145)  (0.215)  (0.180) 
Adj. Coeff.  -0.178
**  -0.095
**  -0.0065  -0.114
** 
  (0.0321)  (0.0432)  (0.0018)  (0.038) 
N  114  114  73  69 
#Lags  2  6  4  8 
Period  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jul 06 
Constants  and  a  trend  are  considered  in  all  specifications,  whereas  the  cointegrating 
relationship does not include a trend but a constant. AIC and BIC determine the optimum 
lag length.  * at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5% significance level. 
 
 7 
The results do not document any clear correlation for a stable cointegration relationship. There 
are differences between both the signs and significance levels of the variables. There are also 
differing results both within the entire sample and within the sample until 2006.   
If  all  three  bivariate  cointegration  relationships  are  investigated,  cointegration  can  be  found 
between  FutLong  and  FutShort.  The  trace  statistic  of  35.94
**  (critical  value  at  the  5% 
significance level: 15.49) definitely refutes the nonexistence of a cointegration rank and just as 
definitely cannot refute the first cointegration rank 1.88
** (critical value at the 5% significance 
level: 3.84). The estimated cointegration equation (standard error in brackets)  
 
t t t ec   FutShort ) 10 , 0 ( 26 , 1 FutLong
* *  
is  both  statistically  significant  and  economically  interpretable.  When  the  number  of  long 
contracts increases, the number of short contracts also increases. The adjustment coefficient in 
this estimation of  -0.04** (0.01) is also significant and negative  – in contrast to the trivariate 
system  –  through  which  deviations  from  the  long-run  trend  are  corrected.  The  existing 
cointegration relationship between FutLong and FutShort is presumably also the cause of the 
detected  cointegration  rank  in  the  trivariate  system  with  WTI,  FutLong  and  FutShort.  This 
presumption  is  also  confirmed  by  the  rejection  of  all  rank  hypotheses  in  both  bivariate 
cointegration analyses between WTI and FutLong abd between WTI and FutShort.
7 
 
Dispersion of beliefs in the stationary world 
The  statistical  results  in  the  preceding  section  combined  with  the  theoretical  considerations 
about deriving the hypotheses suggest that the following approach is appropriate. In order to 
measure  the  dispersion  of  beliefs  among  speculators  regarding  the  oil  price  the  following 
equation is estimated: 
t t t u etLong = WTI   1 0        
where  NetLong  is the  difference  between  FutLong  and  FutShort.  NetLong  is  a  stationary 
variable  in  accordance  with  the  bivariate  cointegrating  equation  shown  above.  Table  3 
documents a robust and highly significant relationship both for the entire sample and the  2006 
sample as well as for both the weekly and monthly data.  
   
                                                       
7 For bivariate cointegration the Engle-Granger method has better small sample properties (Gonzalo and 
Lee 1998). The results of the Engle-Granger method however confirm the results of the Johansen test. We 
therefore continue using the Johansen method in this case. 
(1) 8 
Table 3: OLS regression dependent variable: WTI 
  (W3)  (W3P)  (M3)  (M3P) 
  WTI   WTI   WTI   WTI  
Constants  -0.176  0.033  -0.598  0.074 






  (0.296)  (0.209)  (0.917)  (0.759) 
N  494  342  114  78 
Period  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jul 09  Jan 00 - Jun 06 
R
2  0.05  0.06  0.11  0.34 
DW  1.63  1.74  0.88  1.98 
Calculation performed using Newey-West standard errors. ** at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
The results suggest the following interpretations: a much larger increase in the turnover of long 
futures than of short futures is accompanied by price rises. The coefficient in specification (W3) 
of 1.49 implies a rise in the crude oil price of USD 1.49, if the number of long contracts exceeds 
the number of short contracts by 100,000. The mean NetLong figure for the entire sample is 
nearly 18,000 contracts. This means that the crude oil price rose by an average of USD 0.27 
per  week  (=1.490.18)  due  to  the  dispersion  of  beliefs  of  speculators.  Figure  2  shows  the 




The regression results do not provide evidence of any causal link. It is possible that price rises 
cause  speculators  to  become  more  active,  while  conversely  having  no  impact  on  prices, 
however.  Granger  causality  tests  are  conducted  to  determine  the  direction  of  causality.  For 
short lag lengths the null hypothesis that “NetLong does not influence WTI” can always be 
rejected at the 5% significance level, whereas the inverse null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Figure 2: NetLong Non-commercial
in 100,000
Sources: CFTC, DB Research9 
presumably this may have more to do with size distortions of the Granger causality test than 
with higher lag lengths. Accordingly, the causality appears to run mainly from NetLong to WTI. 
The results of the Granger causality test also raise the question of how strongly lagged NetLong 
terms impact on the crude oil price. Using the weekly data substituting NetLongt-1 for NetLongt 
in 
equation (1) also produces a positive and significant impact.
8 Since in a multivariate regression 
with  several  lagged  regressors  multicollinearity  problems  arise  –  the  correlation  between 
NetLong and its lag is in part larger than 0.9 – we estimate a Polynomial Distributed Lag model 
(PDL). This involves rearranging the following equation 
t k t k t t t u etLong ... etLong etLong = WTI   ) 1 ( 1 2 1 0                  
and  at  the  same  time  reducing  the  number  of  parameters  by  packing  the  data  into  a 
predetermined  polynomial structure.  The  disadvantage  of  a  strictly  predetermined  structure 
compared with the advantage of avoiding multicollinearity problems is typically low since higher-
order polynomials are particularly flexible. Rearrangement leads to the following equation  
t p p t u x ... x x = WTI   2 2 1 1 0           , 
where  now  t u etLong ... etLong etLong =  x k - t 1 - t t 1        , 
    

t
1 etLong =  x
p
p    t
p p k u etLong ) ( ... etLong 1   k - t
1
1 - t
1       
      for  p>1 
and  p 1 0 ,..., ,    contains  the  polynomial  structure  from  which  the     -coefficients  can  be 
replicated. Estimating the above equation with the aid of a PDL with 12 lags (k=12) and a fourth-
degree polynomial  (p=4)  also produces  a highly  significant  overall  effect  for  NetLong (as  the 
sum of contemporaneous and lagged NetLong variables) of 1.26
** (0.35) for the entire sample 
and of 0.77
** (0.21) for the 2006 sample. This means the long-run influence of the NetLong 
variable is less than the short-term effect, which compared with Table 3 in the PDL is much 
higher – in both the 2009 sample and the 2006 sample the coefficient is highly significant and 
larger than 3.  
 
5 Impact of speculators on price volatility 
In this section we test the second hypothesis and measure the influence of the dispersion of 
beliefs of speculators regarding the price volatility of WTI. The volatility test is conducted using a 
GARCH (p,q) process  
 




p t t u etLong u 1
2 2 2                   
where σ
2 is the variance and ut is the error term of the GARCH equation. The residuals are 
modelled using GED
9, since the crude oil yields have either fat tails in the case of weekly data 
or thin tails in the case of monthly data. The GED parameters are included with the regression 
                                                       
8 Using monthly data we find a significant, delayed NetLong variable at the 10% significance level for the 
entire sample until Summer 2009 and almost at the 10% significance level for the sample until summer 
2006. 
9 Acronym for generalized error distribution. 10 
results in Table 4. If the residuals are modelled via a normal distribution the GED parameter has 
a value of 2, for values greater than 2 there are fat tails and with values smaller than 2 there are 
thin tails.  
First, the lag lengths of the GARCH process are determined via the AIC criterion, with the term 
in brackets not being taken into consideration. After discovering the optimum lag length the 
specification is then extended with the NetLong variable. This regressor is always positive and – 
with the exception of specification M4P  – significant
10 and explains part of the variance, so 
hypothesis 2 can be rejected fundamentally. The pre-crisis period until summer 2006 has a very 
similar explanatory level to the consideration of the whole sample. 
 
 
Table 4 (W, M): Dependent variable: WTI 
GARCH  (W4)  (W4P)  (M4)  (M4P) 
(p,q)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (2.1) 
Constant  0.009  0.012  -0.285
**  -0.065 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.233) 
2
1  t    0.038
**  0.004  -0.005  -0.147 
  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.093) 
2





  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.0002) 
2
2  t          0.491
** 




*  1.493 
  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.418)  (1.058) 





parameter  (0.132)  (0.162)  (0.589)  (1.664) 
N  493  342  114  78 
Period  Jan 00 - Jun 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06  Jan 00 - Jun 09  Jan 00 - Jul 06 
DW  1.57   1.64  0.94   1.92 
AIC  determine  the  optimum  lag  length  of  GARCH processes.  * at the 1% significance 
level, ** at the 5% significance level. 
   
                                                       
10 In specification M4P NetLong is, however, only significant at the 10% significance level. 11 
6 Conclusions 
The  econometric  estimates  can  reject  the  null  hypotheses  that  the  dispersion  in  beliefs  of 
speculators has no influence on the crude oil price and its volatility. Both the Granger causality 
tests and the distributed lag models, which also include lagged regressors that measure the 
dispersion in beliefs of speculators, confirm moreover the role of speculation as a precursor to 
price movements. 
There is no doubt that the significant regression results only represent apparent correlations. In 
a complex market like the crude oil market, with many different and partly difficult to quantify 
variables,  there  is  however  with  regard  to  the  modelling  of  estimation  equations  a  trade-off 
between simple and more robust specifications and on the other hand a model that replicates 
the  data-generating  but  is  less  robust  and  easily  overfitted.  In  addition,  the  robust  results 
suggest a causal relationship of speculators operating in the futures market on the crude oil 
spot  price,  both  prior  to  and  after  the  beginning  of  the  financial  crisis.  This  model  cannot, 
however,  reveal  the  motivation  behind  the  positions  built  up  in  the  futures  market  by 
speculators.  Frequently  changing  fundamental  factors  can  be  the  triggers  just  like  simple 
excessive  risk  taking,  in  which  investing  external  funds  in  a  volatile  market  opens  up  the 
potential for the investor to make a small loss but a large profit. 
The results do not only confirm the correctness of the new CFTC estimate, but also provide a 
reference point for an effective regulatory measure. The results do not imply a reduction in the 
activities  of  non-commercials,  but  show  the  significance  of  the  dispersion  in  beliefs  of  non-
commercials for the price of crude oil. Accordingly, a regulatory measure could be aimed at 
preventing the non-commercials in the futures market from displaying too wide a dispersion in 
beliefs,  measured  via  the  difference  between  long  and  short  contracts.  Constraining  this 
difference by temporarily restrict trading or higher trading costs could possibly prevent a soaring 
crude oil price and elevated price volatility. 12 
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